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Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program
University of California, Berkeley
I. Demystifying Judges: Professions And Professional Ideology
Studies of the professions have all too frequently failed to examine rigorously professional discourse and ideology. As a consequence, professional world views are often taken as givens in empirical and theoretical scholarship on the professions. This is due in
large part to the considerable influence of functionalism in the sociology of professions. Deriving from Durkheim (1933), and most notably set out in the work of Parsons (1954 a,b), functionalist theory
views professionals as possessing socially useful esoteric knowledge
and skills which they employ in the service of public and client good
rather than for private gain. This view rather uncritically accepts the
professions' claims to altruism and special competence, which legitimate prerogatives such as restrictive licensing and self-regulation,
and it downplays the significance of professional involvement in
market exchange and its consequences. Much scholarship in the
functionalist tradition considers the rise of professional power and
control as a phenomenon that self-evidently is rather than something
that might be profitably examined historically and sociologically. As
one legal historian revealingly writes:
The general public has need for a professional man in
whom it can repose a particular type of confidence whenever it is faced with some distressing problems, often of a
very personal nature. Hence the most important aspect
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of the practice of law is that it is, and the inherent nature
of things demands that is always shall be, a profession.
(Chroust 1965: xi).

A very different and more recent approach advances a critical
understanding of professions which highlights their political and social context. This scholarship, which has roots in Weber (1978),
builds on the works of Hughes and his students (see e.g., Hughes
1958). Hughes viewed professions not as inevitable products of social differentiation but as occupational groups which have managed
both to achieve exclusive license to carry out activities denied other
occupations and to claim successfully a broad mandate to define the
nature and scope of their work. This perspective emphasizes the
historical specificity and the contingency of professional control in
the occupational marketplace. As subsequently developed by a diverse group of scholars (see, e.g., Abel 1986, 1987; Freidson 1970a, b;
Gordon 1983, 1984; Johnson, 1972; Larson 1977; Starr 1982; for a critique of this perspective see Halliday 1987) this critical approach renders professional claims of expertise and public-mindedness problematic. It views professional ideology itself as a subject for analysis
and it explores the historical, political, economic and cultural conditions in which professional power develops and is employed.
Doris Marie Provine's Judging Credentials is a provocative work
that draws on and furthers the critical approach to the study of professions. The book is a study of judges in lower courts of limited jurisdiction who are not lawyers, a group of considerable size. There
are over 13,000 of them in the United States. In this work Provine
examines the legal profession's assertion that these judges are inferior
to judges who are lawyers. Contrary to both professional claims and
popular belief, Provine argues that lay judges in America's lower
courts perform as well as their lawyer counterparts. Her conclusions
derive from extensive original survey data as well as from a thorough
analysis of the pertinent literature on lay judges. Provine argues that
although characterizations of lay judges' incompetence are empirically unsubstantiated, they nevertheless reveal much about the politi-
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cal and cultural control exerted by professions. Provine's work demystifies lawyers' mandate for monopoly control over judgeships,
and it challenges professional ideology while simultaneously exposing its considerable force in contemporary society.
II. The Rise of Professional Power and Emergence of Professional
Control
In the opening chapters of her book, Provine provides an historical account of lay judges in the United States and of attempts by
lawyers to drive them from the bench. This discussion is particularly
effective because it denaturalizes the legal professionals' privilege
and influences; it forces an examination of the social, political, and
cultural conditions which supported the legal profession's growing
prominence in the judiciary. Provine shows that this development is
considerably more complex than conventional wisdom allows.
There were at first few lawyers practicing in Colonial America,
Provine reminds us. Economic conditions in the largely agrarian
colonies were inhospitable to full-time legal practice. Moreover, the
prevailing religious sentiment in some colonies was antagonistic to
the legal profession. Several colonial legislatures specifically barred
lawyers from their membership. In this type of society, the bulk of
legal business was handled in a self-sufficient fashion by common
citizens. Not surprisingly then, judges in early America were infrequently lawyers. They nonetheless exhibited considerable sophistication and legal awareness in the exercise of their duties.
The expansion of the colonial economy and increased transatlantic trade created conditions amenable to a full-time practicing bar.
lawyers increased in number and power. The institutionalized bar
became more politically active and successful in advancing professional interests. With bar support, several colonies enacted legislation restricting the practice of law to lawyers. Other factors besides
professional self-interest helped to consolidate professional power.
The Crown, for instance, after years of neglect, supported efforts to
organize and strengthen the bar in order to encourage stability and
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regularity in colonial legal business. It was during this period,
Provine tells us, that lawyers began to assert the necessity of excluding nonlawyers from judicial posts. Interestingly, the arguments first
offered in support of restricting judgeships to legally trained profes. sionals did not emphasize the greater capabilities of lawyers. Most
lawyers, after all, were still trained in a haphazard apprentice system
while their competitors for judgeships who were not lawyers were
often local gentlemen who had the benefit of higher fonnal education.
Rather, lawyers argued for restricting judgeships to the brotherhood
of the bar by claiming that lay judges were elitist and class biased.
The early bar's attempts to translate newfound power into institutionalized control met with limited success. There were formidable
political barriers to professional control of the judiciary which included. the Crown's unwillingness to cede total control to lawyers.
However in post-Revolutionary America lawyers achieved greater
power as well as increased monopoly control over the judiciary.
These changes occurred, Provine explains, because of a variety of
factors and despite a general atmosphere of hostility towards lawyers. Lawyers were able to exercise significant influence because of
their prominence in the Continental Congress and in the Constitutional Convention, and they became increasingly well represented in
state legislatures. Additionally, Provine argues, changing popular
notions of law and litigation justified the argument for a judiciary
dominated by lawyers. Law became regarded as a means "not simply to resolve isolated disputes but as a means to shape broad legal
rules to changing conditions" (p.20). Provine argues that such an
image of law facilitated the argument for an all lawyer judiciary capable of dealing with an expansive and technically complex system of
common law. Thus supported by both political efforts and changing
cultural beliefs, the bar's attempts to professionalize the bench met
with slow but gradual success. By the mid nineteenth century lawyers had achieved a monopoly over higher judicial posts even though
their attempts to extend this control to the lower courts met with little
success.
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Provine explores how legislative and judicial attempts to eliminate lay judges continued into the twentieth century. During the
Progressive era court modernization advocates emphasized the need
to professionalize the .justice system. Reform advocates such as Roscoe Pound considered lay judges an anachronism. These critics
claimed that lay judges were both incapable of understanding complex modem litigation and more susceptible to bias and corruption
than lawyers. And yet despite the apparent appeal of such claims for
both lawyers and the educated public, the organized bar was unable
to convince most state legislatures of the necessity for eliminating lay
judges from lower court judicial posts. Provine argues that this was
less the result of any disagreement with the reformers' low assessment of lay justices than it was a capitulation to more pragmatic
concerns such as institutional inertia, the political well-connectedness
of lay. judges, and the tremendous financial costs associated with
replacing lay judges with lawyers.
A different source of criticism emerged in the 1960s when individual litigants rather than organized interest groups began to challenge the constitutionality of nonlawyer judges. Since courts recognized that criminal defendants have a right to legal counsel even for
misdemeanor charges, it was argued that such a right was rendered
meaningless when exercised before judges presumed to be uneducated in the law and thus unable to comprehend lawyers' arguments.
This line of reasoning suggests that in order to make due process and
equal protection rights effective it is necessary to provide criminal
defendants with judges who are lawyers. Provine examines the
mixed success such arguments have achieved. In California the state
supreme court concluded that "[t]he absence of a law degree disables
a judge from understanding counsel" and thus that "[t]he failure to
provide a judge qualified to comprehend and utilize counsel's legal
arguments ... must be considered a denial of due process" (p.68).
This ruling paved the way for the legislative abolition of lay judges in
the California lower courts. The United States Supreme Court found
the claim that the use of lay judges in criminal cases is inherently
unconstitutional less compelling. Importantly, however, Provine argues that this reflected the Court's recognition of practical concerns
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such as the high cost of replacing lay judges with lawyers and deference to state authority more than any support for lay judges. Provine
stresses that in both successful and unsuccessful attacks on the constitutionality of lay judges the underlying characterization of lay justices as inferior was never seriously challenged despite the noticeable
absence of any systematic empirical data on the matter. Unencumbered by facts, legal arguments rested instead on horror stories and
anecdotes about lay judges' judicial performance. A recurring theme
of Provine's book is that the debate over the qualifications of lay
judges occurs at a symbolic or ideological rather than at an empirical
level.
These last points suggest that the bar's inability to achieve a
monopoly over lower court judicial posts may represent a lost battle
in a war otherwise won, since professional claims that lawyer judges
were more autonomous, public-oriented, and technically proficient
than lay judges prevailed even if attempts to abolish lay judges did
not. Provine argues that it was not simply the presumably selfinterested bar that supported eliminating lay judges. Rather, she tells
us, the critique of nonlawyer judges struck responsive chords among
the larger public due to the influence of a set of beliefs and values
described under the rubric of the "culture of professionalism" (Bledstein's
phrase) in which competence and expertise are equated with credentials.
From such a set of beliefs the characterization of lay judges as incompetent
logically follows. Its very taken-for-grantedness illustrates how deeply
professional beliefs and values have come to be accepted as givens in
American society. A special strength of Provine's work is that it renders
such beliefs problematic
III. Comparing Judicial Behavior

The core of Provine's study is an empirical assessment of the
claims made by critics of nonlawyer judicial competence. Provine's
central goal is to determine whether legal credentials make any difference in the quality of lower court judges as critics contend. In
order to test this proposition Provine compared the attitudes and
behavior of lay judges and judges who are lawyers in lower courts of
limited jurisdiction. Although these judges process millions of cases
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annually, this segment of the judicial system has not received much
systematic scholarly attention.
Provine studied over 1500 lower court judges in nonmetropolitan areas of New York State. The bulk of her study data derives from
a descriptive mail survey designed to elicit information regarding the
judicial behavior and attitudes of her study population. Provine supplemented her survey data with limited fieldwork by interviewing
twenty-six judges and observing their courtroom routines. Additionally, Provine brought to the study her four year experience as a town
justice in rural New York.
Provine's study evaluates two broad criticisms of lay judges:
that they lack adequate legal knowledge and they do not apply the
law in an unbiased fashion. In order to test the first claim, Provine
examined whether lay judges are aware of, understand, and adhere
to mandated due process guarantees designed to protect criminal
defendants. She also tested select behavior such as whether lay
judges impose bail more frequently than judges who are lawyers,
rely on arresting officers for advice on bail determinations, or punish
more severely those defendants who plead not guilty and are subsequently convicted after trial. Affirmative answers to any of these
issues would tend to support the notion that lay judges are neither as
knowledgeable about the law nor as meticulous in adhering to due
process guarantees as their counterparts who are lawyers. Provine
found some differences between lay and lawyer judicial behavior,
although it was not always in the direction that critics of lay judges
would predict. Her fieldwork also provided her with examples of
judicial misconduct, but this behavior was not limited to lay judges.
She also tested the second claim that the lay judges lack consistency
when exercising discretion in such areas as sentencing. The thrust of
this claim is that these judges fail to apply the law in an unbiased
fashion, that their decisions are made ad hoc rather than being
grounded in legal principles and precedent. Provine concludes that
her data do not support the breezy criticisms of lay judges so prevalent in the literature. She argues that lawyer and nonlawyer judges
exhibit few statistically significant differences in the key indicators of
knowledge and fairness. Rather, Provine contends that poor facili-
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ties, the lack of administrative support staff, dismal salaries, as well
as the legal professionals' attacks, account more for the negative image of lay judges than a lack of judicial competence.
How confident can we be in these findings? Provine is generally careful to ground her arguments in the data. Nevertheless, there
are limitations to her mail survey research. The major premise of
such research is that the data accurately measure actual behavior.
Yet there are always concerns of selective memory associated with
reporting past behavior. This is especially important in Judging Credentials, since the lay judges Provine studied are well aware of their
second-class status, are sensitive to slights to their office, and often
pride themselves on their capacity to exhibit lawyerlike knowledge
and demeanor. Such respondents may be unlikely to provide answers'that would serve to characterize them unfavorably. For these
reasons Judging Credentials would benefit from greater analysis of
actual courtroom behavior to supplement the self-reporting of the
survey respondents. Provine does provide information gleaned from
interviews and observations of the judges she studied, yet this
fieldwork is not sufficiently extensive to serve as more than suggestive background material (nor was it intended to be). Ultimately,
these seem rather minor concerns given the overall contributions of
Provine's study.
While her survey data do not demonstrate conclusively that lay
judges are "virtually indistinguishable" from judges who are lawyers,
as she claims (p. 103), they do allow Provine to make a strong preliminary argument to that effect. Moreover, Provine's findings are
generally supported by other related studies which she cites. In sum,
Provine's data are more than sufficient to rebut the facile and sweeping critique of lay judicial competence so prominent in professional
rhetoric.
IV. Summary And Conclusion
Provine makes a valuable contribution to law and society scholarship with her study of lay judge - in the United States. Judging
Credentials provides preliminary empirical data on a level of the judi-
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ciary that remains understudied - since research on lower courts still lags
behind the study of the appellate judicial process - and for this reason
alone the book is to be commended. Additionally, Judging Credentials is
significant for what it reveals about professional power and control.
. Provine's historically and empirically grounded analysis illuminates the
politics of the legal profession's attempts to achieve monopoly control over
the judiciary, and it convincingly challenges the profession's claims that lay
judges are inherently inferior to judges with law degrees. Provine makes
the case that the debate over the credentialling of judges often has more to
do with professional self interest than with the public interest She contends
that a consequence of the bar's increasing control over the judiciary is that
lay participation in and knowledge of judicial process diminishes and that
dependence on lawyers and alienation from law increases.
Although Provine highlights the overt politics of judicial professionalization she is also sensitive to more covert forms of professional control
operating at the ideological level. An ironic message in Judging Credentials is that although lay judges may be as qualified for the lower courts as
judges who are lawyers, it is likely that professional claims to the contrary
will remain unchallenged. The notion that credentials equate with competence is not only a central tenet of professional ideology, but it is also to a
considerable extent an unquestioned popular belief. Even though lawyers
as a class are frequently held in low esteem, attempts to curb lay judges by
replacing them with lawyers are generally considered progressive. Judging
Credentials thus begins to explore how professional values, beliefs, and
world views exert hegemony. Provine's work is more preliminary than it is
fully developed, but it complements other scholarship investigating professional ideology, and it suggests fruitful directions for future research. Judging Credentials is an exciting book which should appeal to a wide audience. Provine's arguments are provocative, and. they merit serious consideration from readers interested in the lower courts and the sociology of
professions.

260

Legal Studies Forum

REFERENCES

Abel, Richard. (1987) 'Theories of the Professions," in Richard Abel, The
Legal Profession in England and Wales. New York: Basil Blackwell.
__. (1986) "Lawyers," in Leon Lipson and Stanton Wheeler, eds., l.i:lw
and the Social Sciences. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Chroust, Anton. (1965) The Rise of the Legal Profession in America, Vol. I.,
New York: Free Press.
Durkheim, Emile. (1933) The Division of l.i:lhor in Society. Translated by
George Simpson. New York: Free Press.
Freidson, Eliot. (1970a) Profession of Medicine. New York: Dodd, Mead
and Co.
__. (1970b) Professional Dominance. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.
Gordon, Robert. (1984) 'The Ideal and the Actual in the Law," in Gawalt,
ed., The New High Priests. Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press.
__. (1983) "Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American
Enterprise," in Geison, ed., Professions and Professional Ideologies
in America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Halliday, Terence. (1987) Beyond Monopoly. Chicago: University of ChicagoPress.
Johnson, Terence. (1972) Professions and Power. London: British Sociological Association.
Larson, Margali. (1977) The Rise of Professionalism. Berkeley: University
of California Press.

Review of Judging Credentials..

261

Parsons, Talcott. (1954a) ''The Professions and Social Structure," in Parsons, ed., Essays in Sociological Theory. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
__. (1954b) "A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession," in Parsons,
ed., Essays in Sociological Theory. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
Starr, Paul. (1982) The Social Transformation of American Medicine. New
York: Basic Books.
Weber, Max. (1978) Economy and Society. Translated by Guenther Roth
and Gaus Wittich. 2 vols. Berkeley: University of California Press.

